State of Utah v. Anthony James Valdez : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
State of Utah v. Anthony James Valdez : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Lori J. Seppi; John O'Connell Jr.; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Valdez, No. 2003089 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4127
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ, : Case No. 20030089-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Aggravated Burglary, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999), Purchase or Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503(2)(a) (Supp. 2002), and Criminal Mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (Supp. 2002), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton presiding. 
LORI J. SEPPI (9428) 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. (6955) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6 th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR - b kuu4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ, : Case No. 20030089-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Aggravated Burglary, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999), Purchase or Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503(2)(a) (Supp. 2002), and Criminal Mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (Supp. 2002), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton presiding. 
LORI J. SEPPI (9428) 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. (6955) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
INTRODUCTION . 1 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE 
BATSON ISSUE IS PROPERLY PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STATE'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
VIOLATED EQUAL PROTECTION 1 
A. Valdez Properly Presented the Issue for Review 1 
1. Valdez's Objection to the Prosecutor's 
Peremptory Challenges Was Timely 2 
2. Valdez Was Not Required to Renew His 
Batson Objection 5 
3. Valdez Marshaled the Evidence in Support 
of the Trial Court's Ruling 7 
B. This Court Should Reverse Because the State's 
Peremptory Challenges Violated Equal Protection 12 
1. The State Waived the Prima Facie 
Requirement 12 
2. The State Failed to Produce a Gender-Neutral 
Explanation 13 
3. The Trial Court Clearly Erred by Accepting 
the State's Peremptory Strikes Even Though They 
Were Gender Discriminatory 14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE BWS 
ISSUE IS PROPERLY PRESERVED AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING MCKENZIE'S 
TESTIMONY 17 
A. Valdez Properly Preserved the BWS Issue 17 
B. Valdez Was Not Required to Marshal the Evidence in 
Support of the Trial Court's Admission of McKenzie's 
Testimony 19 
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Admitting 
McKenzie's Testimony 20 
D. The Trial Court's Admission of McKenzie's Testimony 
Was Harmful Error 24 
CONCLUSION 24 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Adame v. State. 534 S.E.2d 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) 21 
Arcorenv. United States. 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1991) 21 
Barr v. Columbia. 378 U.S. 146 (1964) 5 
Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 13, 14, 19 
Brown v. Kelly. 973 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1992) 14 
Cal Wadsworth Construction v. City of St. George. 898 P.2d 
1372 (Utah 1995) 19 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) 8 
Ford v. Georgia. 498 U.S. 411 (1991) 2, 5, 6, 7 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission. 945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) 3, 18 
Holmstrom v. CR England. Inc.. 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281 3 
Ikon Office Solutions. Inc. v. Crook. 2000 UT App 217. 6 P.3d 
1143 6 
J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127(1994) 8 
James v. Kentucky. 466 U.S. 341 (1984) 5 
J.W. v. State. 2001 UT App 208, 30 P.3d 1232 6 
Moon v. Moon. 1999 UT App 12, 973 P.2d 431 7, 8, 10, 20 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
NAACP v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) 5 
People v.Johnson. 74 P.3d 349 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) 21 
People v. Simpkins. 697N.E.2d 302 (111. App. Ct. 1998) 22 
People v. Williams. 93 Ca. Rptr. 2d 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) 21 
Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) 2, 3 
State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42, 5 P.3d 642 18 
State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d450 (Utah 1994) 4, 12 
State v. Arguelles. 2003 UT 1, 63 P.3d 731 7 
State v. Belgard. 830 P.2d 264 (Utah 1992) 4 
State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 6 
State v. Cannon. 2002 UT App 18. 41 P.3d 1153 8, 11, 13, 14 
State v. Chapoose. 1999 UT 83, 985 P.2d 915 6 
State v. Chatwin. 2002 UT App 363, 58 P.3d 867 13, 14 
State v. Colwell. 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177 19 
State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 19 
State v. Grecineer. 569 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 1997) 21 
State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114, 61 P.3d 1062 6 
State v.Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert. 
denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,13 , 
20,23 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
State v.Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4, 20 P.3d 265 6 
State v. Holeate. 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 4, 7 
State v. lore. 801 P.2d 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 18,21 
State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991) 4 
State v. Kellev. 2000 UT 41, 1 P.3d 546 18 
State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 9 
State v. Macial. 854 P.2d 543 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 6 
State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App.). cert. 
denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) 8, 14, 15 
State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 8 
State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986) 18, 21 
State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) 21, 22 
State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991) 6,14 
State v. Trostle. 951 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1997) 16 
State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332, 37 P.3d 260 19 
State v. Weaver. 648 N.W.2d 355 (S.D. 2002) 21 
State v. Whittle. 1999 UT 96, 989 P.2d 52 6 
Tisco Intermountain & State Insurance Fund v. Industrial 
Commn. 744 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987) 10, 15, 17 
United States v. Cure. 996 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993) 16 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R. App. P. 24 7, 19 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18 2, 3, 6, 13, 14 
Utah R. Evid. 402 21 
Utah R. Evid. 702 21,22 
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 comment 23 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI 23 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12 23 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
5 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Isreal, Criminal Procedure. 
§ 22.3(d) (1999 & Supp. 2003) 16 
vi 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. :;,':': 
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ, : Case No. 20030089-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the State's arguments, this Court should reach the merits of both the 
Batson issue and the Battered Women's Syndrome (BWS) testimony issue. Further, this 
Court should reverse because the State's peremptory strikes violated equal protection, 
and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting McKenzie's BWS testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE BATSON ISSUE IS 
PROPERLY PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE STATE'S 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES VIOLATED EQUAL PROTECTION 
This Court should reverse because: (A) Valdez properly presented the Batson 
issue for review, and (b) the State's peremptory challenges violated equal protection. 
A. Valdez Properly Presented the Issue for Review. 
This Court should reach the merits of the Batson issue because: (1) Valdez's 
objection was timely; (2) Valdez was not required to renew his objection after the State's 
explanation or the trial court's ruling; and (3) Valdez marshaled the evidence. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1. Valdez's Objection to the Prosecutor's Peremptory Challenges Was Timely. 
Objections to the State's peremptory challenges must be timely to preserve the 
issue for appeal. See Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) ("It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record 
must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to 
obtain a ruling thereon." (citation omitted)). Whether a defendant's objection is timely 
depends on "local practices." Ford v. Georgia. 498 U.S. 411, 423 (1991) (citing Batson 
v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 99-100 (1986)). Thus, if a state chooses, it "may adopt a 
general rule that a Batson claim is untimely if it is raised for the first time on appeal, or 
after the jury is sworn, or before its members are selected." Id.; see Aple. Br. at 14-15. 
In Utah, the timeliness of a Batson objection is governed by rule 18 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (holding rule 18 is applicable to a "constitutionally-grounded objection to the 
State's peremptory challenges"), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). Rule 18 says, 
"A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to try the 
action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror is sworn 
but before any of the evidence is presented." Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2). Under rule 18, a 
trial court implicitly finds good cause by "allowing consideration of the objection on its 
merits." Harrison, 805 P.2d at 773, 776 (holding objection timely because trial court 
implicitly found good cause "by allowing counsel to proceed with their arguments"). 
2 
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In Harrison, the defendant objected immediately after the jury was sworn. IcL_ 
The State suggests, without supporting citation, that Harrison "represents the outside 
permissible limit for a Batson challenge pursuant to the 'good cause' exception." Aple. 
Br. at 18, 19. However, this argument is contrary to the language of rule 18, Utah case 
law, and the policy behind Utah's preservation rule. 
Rule 18 is expressly broader than Harrison because it says a trial court may 
consider a Batson objection for "good cause" at any time before "evidence is presented." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2). Utah case law mirrors this language by saying an issue is 
preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity 
to rule on the issue."'" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997).1 Similarly, the policy behind Utah's preservation rule supports the language 
of rule 18. See Carlston, 776 P.2d at 656 (holding preservation rule prevents "defendants 
from 'sandbagging' the prosecution by waiting until trial has concluded unsatisfactorily 
before insisting on an explanation for jury strikes that by then the prosecutor may largely 
have forgotten"; facilitates remedy by allowing trial court to seat wrongfully struck 
"venireperson" rather than "setting aside the conviction"; allows trial court to determine 
1
 See Holmstrom v. CR England Inc.. 2000 UT App 239,f26, 8 P.3d 281 (holding 
"party must specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought 'to a "level of 
consciousness"'"); Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776 (noting defendant's Batson objection was 
timely because he "met the requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his 
constitutional objection in the trial court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted); 
Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655-56 (holding party waived Batson issue because she "proceeded 
to trial without presenting her Batson-type claim to the trial judge for determination"). 
3 
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validity of peremptory challenges "on the evidence presented"; provides prosecutor 
"opportunity to present evidence of any constitutionally permissible reasons for 
challenges to the venire members"; and provides appellate court "factual basis in the 
record on which to conduct a meaningful review" (citation omitted)).2 
Here, Valdez's objection was timely because he objected before any evidence was 
presented and at a time when the trial court could still consider and rule on the objection. 
R. 209:78. Then, as in Harrison, the trial court "implicitly" found good cause "by 
allowing counsel to proceed with their arguments."3 Id at 78-79; Harrison, 805 P.2d at 
2
 State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,^11, 10 P.3d 346 (holding preservation required 
because "the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, 
if appropriate, correct it," and "a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an 
objection with the strategy of enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, 
if that strategy fails,. . . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse" (quotations 
and citations omitted) (alterations in original)); State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 
1992) (holding no policy concern prevents appellate consideration of motion to suppress 
not raised prior to trial because it was fully considered in an evidentiary hearing); State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1160 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that when trial court considers 
merits of evidentiary ruling for the first time in a timely post-trial motion, the only policy 
concern is whether trial court had an opportunity to fully address the merits). 
3
 The State argues the trial court's consideration of the merits was merely a 
"recognition that even though the Batson challenge was untimely, it would be best to 
make a record on the merits." Aple. Br. at 19-20 (citing State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 
458 n. 8 (Utah 1994)). However, Alvarez is distinguishable. In Alvarez, there was no 
question of whether the defendant's Batson objection was timely. Id. Instead, the trial 
court ruled the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case and "requested that the 
prosecutor put on his race-neutral reasons for excluding jurors" simply to facilitate the 
appeal. Id Conversely, here, the trial court asked the prosecutor to explain his 
challenges not to facilitate the appeal but to make a ruling based on the prosecutor's 
explanation. R. 209:78-79. Thus, this case is comparable to Harrison, where the trial 
court's act of asking the prosecutor to explain the challenges, accepting the prosecutor's 
explanation and denying the defendant's objection was an implicit finding of good cause. 
4 
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776; see Ford, 498 U.S. at 421 ("The fact that the court reviewed petitioner's [ Batson] 
claim on the merits . . . presupposes the claim's timeliness.11). 
Further, even if this Court concludes a defendant must raise a Batson objection 
before "the venire is dismissed and the jury sworn," it should still reach the merits in this 
case because nothing apprised Valdez of this limitation. See. Ford, 498 U.S. at 424 
(holding court cannot prevent review by applying "rule unannounced at the time of 
petitioner's trial"); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 457 (1958) (declining to apply 
state rule, even though it appeared "in retrospect to form part of a consistent pattern of 
procedures," because defendant could not be "deemed to have been apprised of its 
existence"); James v. Kentucky, 466 US. 341, 348-51 (1984) (holding only a "firmly 
established and regularly followed state practice" may be interposed by a State to prevent 
subsequent review a federal constitutional claim); Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 
(1964) (state rules "not strictly or regularly followed" may not bar our review). 
2. Valdez Was Not Required to Renew His Batson Objection. 
Valdez was not required to renew his Batson objection after the prosecutor's 
explanation or after the trial court's ruling. See Aple. Br. at 21. A state may adopt a 
general rule that an objection must be renewed. See. Aple. Br. at 21-22 (citation omitted). 
However, absent a clear state rule, the defendant cannot be precluded from appealing a 
Batson issue for failure to renew. See Ford, 498 U.S. at 424 (holding court cannot 
See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. 
5 
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prevent review by applying "rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial"). 
In Utah, there is no clear rule requiring a defendant to renew a Batson objection. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2). Instead, there is a general rule that Utah courts "will not 
require a party to continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has 
rendered a decision on the issue." State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4,1(14, 20 P.3d 265 .4 Utah 
courts have applied this general rule to Batson cases. See State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 
153, 155-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (reaching merits where defendant did not renew 
objection); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 336-43 (Utah 1991) (same); Harrison. 805 P.2d 
at 773, 778 (same); State v. Macial. 854 P.2d 543, 544-47 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (same); 
cf Ford. 498 U.S. at 418-19 (1991) ("We think petitioner must be treated as having 
raised such a claim, although he certainly failed to do it with the clarity that appropriate 
citations would have promoted" because his pretrial motion "could reasonably have been 
4
 See State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114,1(20, 61 P.3d 1062 (holding "'defendant [is 
not required] to object or to renew his motion to suppress at trial where the trial judge is 
also the judge who ruled on the pretrial motion'" (citation omitted)); State v. Chapoose , 
1999 UT 83,1(8, 985 P.2d 915 (holding defendant did not invite error even though 
declined interview offered after evaluator reached conclusions because "once the 
evaluator was fully committed" the harm was done and the "only remedy was for 
[defendant] to obtain a fresh evaluation" and the "only way to get that was to go through 
sentencing and then appeal, which he did"); J.W.v. State, 2001 UT App 208,1(15 n. 4, 30 
P.3d 1232 (holding sufficiency argument preserved because both parties argued evidence 
during closing, trial court made finding, and "any further objections or motions regarding 
this issue would have been futile"); Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Crook , 2000 UT App 
217,1J14, 6 P.3d 1143 (holding no need for party to move to dissolve where "it would 
have been duplicative, costly, and probably futile"); cL State v. Whittle. 1999 UT 96,1(34, 
989 P.2d 52 ("'"The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be 
futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance."'" (citations omitted)). 
6 
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intended and interpreted to raise a claim under the Equal Protection Clause on the 
evidentiary theory articulated in Batson's antecedent."). 
Here, Valdez met the Utah rule by objecting to the prosecutor's peremptory 
challenges, thereby allowing the trial court to rule on his objection and preventing 
himself from strategically hiding the objection until after he saw how his case proceeded. 
See Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ [11. Thus, because nothing in Utah law warned him to 
renew his objection, Valdez cannot be prevented from appealing the issue because he did 
not renew his objection. See Ford, 498 U.S. at 423. 
3. Valdez Marshaled the Evidence in Support of the Trial ('«nr1 \ Ruling. 
The State argues this Court should not review the Batson issue because Valdez 
merely acknowledged '"the existence of evidence to marshal.'" Aple. Br. at 23 (quoting 
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT l,f68, 63 P.3d 731). In Arguelles, our supreme court held 
the party failed to marshal because he simply prefaced "his analysis with an admission 
that 'there is evidence to marshal in support' of the trial court's findings." Arguelles, 
2003 UT 1 at ^ [68. Contrarily, here, Valdez marshaled the evidence. 
A "party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). To marshal, "the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Moon v. 
Moon, 1999 UT App 12,f24, 973 P.2d 431. Specifically, to marshal the evidence in a 
7 
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Batson issue, the defendant must list every scrap of information the trial court had about 
each challenged juror. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 142 n. 13 (1994) (holding 
"exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines 
public confidence in the fairness of the system1'); State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 464 
(Utah Ct. App.) (holding "improper dismissal of even one venireman is intolerable" 
(citations omitted)), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). "After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence." Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at ^24. Here, Valdez marshaled by listing the 
information the trial court had about each challenged juror and showing the trial court 
clearly erred by accepting the prosecutor's explanation in light of this information. See 
Aplt. Br. at 27-32 (quoting State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,^11, 41 P.3d 1153). 
In its brief, the State offers its own marshaled evidence. Aple. Br. at 23-27. 
However, this marshaling interprets evidence and presents argument. See Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) ("Fire Insurance has made no attempt to 
marshal the evidence in support of the jury finding of fraud. In fact, all Fire Insurance 
has done is argue selected evidence favorable to . . . its position." (citations omitted)); 
State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("However, this statement 
mischaracterizes Officer Watkins's testimony and is contrary to the record."). 
First, in regard to Valerio, the State claims, "The prosecutor struck her because of 
her employment, which he believed would make her 'somewhat overly compassionate.'" 
8 
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Aple. Br. at 24; see also id. at 24 n. 6 (claiming "prosecutor stated that Valerio's 
employment was not a basis for a for-cause strike, but was the basis of his peremptory 
strike."). This statement is not marshaled evidence but an interpretation of the evidence 
presented to bolster the State's argument. See id Moreover, this interpretation is not 
supported by the record. See R. 209:79. When the prosecutor said Valerio's work for a 
nonprofit organization was "not a basis upon which to strike her," he was explaining his 
own peremptory challenge, not discussing the trial court's for-cause strikes. Id. Thus, as 
the prosecutor himself explained, he struck Valerio because he "felt her responses lined 
up in a way that would make her not a helpful witness for the State and that she would be 
somewhat overly compassionate." Id 
Second, in regard to Gonzalez, the State paraphrases to make Gonzalez's answers 
sound matter of fact. Aple. Br. at 24-25. Thus, the State's marshaling is actually 
interpretation of the record to support its argument. See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 
491 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("The marshaling requirement provides the appellate court the 
basis from which to conduct a meaningful review of facts challenged on appeal."). 
Moreover, absent the State's paraphrased assistance, the marshaled evidence does not 
distinguish Gonzalez as excessively matter of fact. See Aplt. Br. at 5-6, 9, 26, 30. 
Third, in regard to Morely, the State says, "The prosecutor was concerned that 
Morely would be too compassionate based on her 'position,' but only referred to her 
work as a piano teacher and not her Title-I-funded position." Aple. Br. at 26 n. 8. Later, 
9 
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the State suggests the prosecutor actually considered Morely 's Title-I-funded position 
even though he did not "remember" doing so during his explanation. Aple. Br. at 31 n.9. 4 
This statement is not marshaled evidence, but an expansion of the prosecutor's 
explanation to improve the State's argument. IdL. Besides, there is no suggestion in the 
I 
record that the prosecutor considered Morely's Title-I position when deciding she was 
overly compassionate. R. 209:79-80; Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial 
i 
Comm'n, 744 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987) (holding "it cannot be assumed that facts 
exist" in the absence of evidence). The State also says the prosecutor "considered 
[Morely's] magazine choices, but acknowledged that this was just a 'subtle thing.'" Aple. i 
Br. at 26 n. 8; see also Aple. Br. at 31 n. 9. This statement is not marshaled evidence, but 
a paraphrased rendition of the record that supports the State's argument. IcL Moreover, 
this statement is not supported by the record. See. R. 209:79-80. In reality, the 
prosecutor directly relied on Morely's subscriptions to the Deseret News, Sports 
Illustrated, and Reader's Digest in his decision to strike her as overly compassionate. IcL 
Finally, the State completes its marshaling by drawing comparisons to show the 
"reasons offered by the prosecutor for the peremptory strikes did not apply to any of the 
seated jurors." Aple. Br. at 26. However, these comparisons are not marshaled evidence 
but specially selected facts that support the State's argument. See. Moon, 1999 UT App 
12 at TJ24 ("In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present.. . every scrap of competent evidence."). Moreover, these 
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comparisons do not justify the prosecutor's explanation. See Aple. Br. at 26-27. First, 
the fact that none of the seated jurors were employed by a nonprofit agency or taught 
school under a Title-I grant is irrelevant because the prosecutor did not consider these 
facts when striking Valerio and Morely. R. 209:79-80. Second, contrary to the State's 
claim, several venire persons, including those actually seated, had subscriptions in 
common with Morely.5 Id, at 10-32; Aplt. Br. at 23 n.6. Third, distinguishing Morely 
from the other Deseret News subscribers because they had relatives in law enforcement is 
irrelevant because the prosecutor did not consider these facts when making his 
peremptory challenges. R. 209:79-80. Fourth, although no seated jurors taught piano at 
home, this comparison fails to distinguish Morely from other jurors with similar 
occupations.6 See Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at f 15 (remanding to make adequate 
findings of why prosecutor complained of struck juror's education but "failed to voice 
the same concern with any of the seven other venire persons who had similar, or 
identical, educational backgrounds"). Fifth, distinguishing Gonzalez from Curtis 
because she "related incorrect information" about the charged crime and "only 'thought' 
5
 At least three men and two women subscribed to sports magazines, including 
Sports Illustrated, and five men and eleven women subscribed to a newspaper, including 
the Deseret News. R. 209:10-32. Further, although Morely was the only venire person 
to specifically say she subscribed to Reader's Digest, one man and one woman said they 
subscribed to many magazines without elaborating, and one man and two women said 
they enjoyed reading. Id 
6
 Three women were teachers, three women worked in the home, two women were 
volunteers or nonprofit employees, one man was a gardener, one man was a baker and 
one man was retired. R. 209:10-32. 
11 
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she could set aside outside information,ff Aple. Br. at 26-27, is irrelevant because these 
comparisons do not demonstrate how Gonzalez was more matter of fact than Curtis or 
any other venire person. R. 209:79. Sixth, the fact that Thornton had previously served 
on a jury is irrelevant because the prosecutor struck Thornton not because of her jury 
service but because he assumed, without asking, that manslaughter was a lesser-included 
offense even though no lesser-included offense was charged here. IcL 
B. This Court Should Reverse Because the State's Peremptory Challenges 
Violated Equal Protection. 
This Court should reverse because: (1) the State concedes it waived the prima 
facie requirement, (2) the prosecutor failed to give a gender-neutral explanation, and (3) 
the trial court clearly erred by holding Valdez had not proved purposeful discrimination. 
1. The State Waived the Prima Facie Requirement. 
The State concedes the "issue of whether a prima facie case was established is 
waived." Aple. Br. at 28. However, it argues the "weakness of [Valdez's] prima facie 
case may be considered in step 3" because Valdez "bases his prima facie case on nothing 
more than the fact that the prosecutor used 100% of his strikes against women." IdL. at 
27-28 (citations omitted). Contrary to the State's argument, explaining "that the 
prosecutor used 100% of his strikes against women" is a prima facie showing of gender 
discrimination. See Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457 ("Numerical evidence alone may be 
sufficient to establish a pattern of peremptory strikes against minority jurors, but a 
defendant must show that 'his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the 
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identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of peremptories 
against the group."1 (citation omitted)); Harrison, 805 P.2d at 777 (holding a "'"pattern" 
of strikes against [female] jurors might give rise to an inference of discrimination.'" 
(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97)). Besides, Valdez does not rely solely on numerical 
evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 20-21. Rather, Valdez's prima facie case is strengthen by the 
underlying facts, namely that Valdez was accused of a gender-related crime, and, unlike 
Valdez, the alleged victim and all but one of the State's witnesses were women. Id. 
2. The State Failed to Produce a Gender-Neutral Explanation. 
In its brief, the State summarily concludes that "the prosecutor's explanations 
were not inherently discriminatory and, therefore for purposes of step 2, they were valid." 
Aple. Br. at 30. However, in reaching this conclusion, the State wholly ignores Utah's 
requirement that the prosecutor's explanation not only be "facially neutral" but also 
"reasonably clear and specific, related to the case being tried, and legitimate." See State 
v. Chatwin. 2002 UT App 363,17, 58 P.3d 867; see. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at %9 
(same). Thus, because the prosecutor's explanation was not facially neutral, reasonably 
clear and specific, related to the case being tried, or legitimate, the prosecutor failed to 
produce a gender-neutral explanation. See Aplt. Br. at 21-27.7 
7
 In a later section, the State attempts to justify the prosecutor's failure to be 
reasonably clear and specific by arguing the prosecutor "had to rely primarily on" his 
memory and illegible notes. Aple. Br. at 31. However, because the Utah rule allows a 
defendant to make a Batson objection at any time before evidence is presented, the 
prosecutor should have protected himself by taking legible notes. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
13 
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3. The Trial Court Clearly Erred by Accepting the State's Peremptory Strikes 
Even Though They Were Gender Discriminatory. 
The State agrees that, when ruling on a Batson objection, a trial court must 
" 'undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available.'" Aple. Br. at 30 (quoting Cannon. 2002 UT App 18 at ^|13); see 
Pharris, 846 P.2d 464 ("Because of the necessity of evaluating the discrimination issue 
according to specific analytical guidelines, the trial court must create a complete 
record."); Span, 819 P.2d at 343 (remanding because lack of findings by trial court made 
difficult to assess adequacy of prosecutor's explanation on appeal). It also admits that 
the trial court's ruling in this case was "not a model ruling" and failed to "explicitly find 
the prosecutor credible." Aple. Br. at 30-31. Despite these concessions, the State argues 
the trial court's ruling was not clearly erroneous. Id. Moreover, the State argues the trial 
court's ruling was "in context, complete," making remand for additional findings 
unnecessary. Aple. Br. at 31, 34; see Aplt. Br. at 32-33. However, this Court should 
either reverse because the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous or remand because 
the trial court failed to follow the required procedure for ruling on a Batson objection. 
First, the State argues the trial court's credibility finding was implied because the 
18(c)(2); Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363 at f7 ("[0]nce the prima facie case has been 
established, the proponent of a peremptory strike must provide the trial court with a 
neutral explanation."); Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Prosecutors 
would be well advised - when contemplating striking a jurors for reasons of demeanor -
to make contemporaneous notes as to the specific behavior on the prospective juror's 
part that renders such person unsuitable for service on a particular case."). 
14 
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court could not have ruled "unless it had found the prosecutor credible." Id_ at 31 
(citation omitted). However, the prosecutor's credibility is a necessary finding that 
cannot be assumed simply because the trial court rules in the prosecutor's favor. See 
Pharos, 846 P.2d 464-65 ("The inadequacy of the findings is exemplified by the trial 
court's failure to record its evaluation of credibility" and "before an appellate court can 
offer proper deference to trial court determinations based on credibility, the trial court 
must make appropriate findings."). This is especially true where, as here, nothing in the 
record suggests the trial court even considered the prosecutor's credibility. See, e.g., 
Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund, 744 P.2d at 1342 (holding "it cannot be assumed 
that facts exist" in the absence of evidence). 
Second, the State fails to show the prosecutor relied on more than group bias 
when striking Valerio, Morely and Gonzalez. Although the State claims Valerio and 
Morely's occupations were unique, it does not explain how these occupations made 
Valerio or Morely overly compassionate. See Aple. Br. at 26-27; Aplt. Br. at 29-30. 
Similarly, it makes no attempt to explain how the prosecutor knew Morely had no gun 
knowledge without asking her. See. Aple. Br. at 23-34; Aplt. Br. at 30. Finally, although 
the State paraphrases Gonzalez's statements to make them sound matter of fact, it fails to 
distinguish her from the other jurors. See. Aple. Br. at 24-25; Aplt. Br. at 26, 30. 
Third, the State fails to justify the prosecutor's failure to question the jurors to 
verify the traits and biases he suspected. See Aple. Br. at 23-34; Aplt. Br. at 30-31. 
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Fourth, the State fails to show the prosecutor challenged Morely and Thornton for 
reasons related to the case. The State alleges the prosecutor appropriately struck 
Thornton for her prior jury service. Aple. Br. at 34 (citing 5 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold 
H. Isreal, Criminal Procedure. § 22.3(d) at 329-32 (1999 & Supp. 2003)). However the 
cases alluded to by the State do not validate striking every person with jury experience. 
See, e.g.. United States v. Cure, 996 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993) (service on prior jury 
which acquitted); State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869, 877 (Ariz. 1997) ("participation on 
prior acquitting jury"). Rather, they uphold striking jurors whose prior service is relevant 
to the present case. See kL Here, the prosecutor struck Thornton because he assumed 
manslaughter was a lesser-included offense. R. 209:79. However, he did not verify this 
assumption or explain how it would prevent Thornton from being impartial where no 
lesser included offense was charged. See. Aplt. Br. at 26. Similarly, the State asserts the 
prosecutor appropriately struck Morely because gun knowledge was relevant. Aple. Br. 
at 32. However, it fails to explain how the prosecutor knew Morely had no gun 
knowledge or why special knowledge of guns was necessary to decide witness 
credibility. See Aple. Br. at 32; Aplt. Br. 26-27, 31. Specifically, the State claims gun 
knowledge was relevant because Valdez used three peremptory challenges to strike 
"jurors who hunted and/or had military experience." Aple. Br. at 32. However, the State 
did not request that Valdez explain his peremptory strikes. R. 209. Consequently, there 
is no evidence from which to infer Valdez struck the specified jurors for their firearm 
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knowledge. See Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund, 744 P.2d at 1342 (holding "it 
cannot be assumed that facts exist" in the absence of evidence). 
Fifth, the State fails to show the prosecutor's challenges were based on reasons 
not equally applicable to the jurors not challenged. Although it paraphrases Gonzalez's 
statements to make them sound matter of fact, the State fails to show Valerio or Morely 
were more compassionate or Gonzalez was more matter of fact than the other jurors. See 
Aple. Br. 32-33; Aplt. Br. at 24-26, 31. Further, the State fails to distinguish Gonzalez 
and Thornton from Curtis. See. Aple. Br. at 33-34. It is irrelevant that Curtis had "two 
uncles who were retired police officers and a sister-in-law who had been the victim of 
domestic violence," Aple. Br. at 34, because the prosecutor did not consider these facts 
when striking Gonzalez and Thornton. R. 209:79-80. Rather, even though Curtis 
remembered the case in much more detail than Gonzalez and Thornton, the prosecutor 
struck Gonzalez and Thornton for their knowledge of the case. See Aplt. Br. at 31-32. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE BWS ISSUE IS 
PROPERLY PRESERVED AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY ADMITTING McKENZIE'S TESTIMONY 
This Court should review Valdez's BWS issue because it was properly preserved. 
Moreover, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting McKenzie's testimony and the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial. 
A. Valdez Properly Preserved the BWS Issue. 
The State claims Valdez did not preserve this issue for appeal because below he 
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only argued the BWS testimony "lacked sufficient scientific foundation to be 
admissible." Aple. Br. at 34. However, besides arguing insufficient scientific 
foundation, Valdez also argued McKenzie's testimony was inadmissible because it was 
"anecdotal statistical evidence concerning matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis 
such as witness veracity," under State v. Iorg. 801 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); it 
was "not admissible under any rule or statute," citing State v. Rammeh 721 P.2d 498, 500 
(Utah 1986); its "probative value was substantially outweighed by [its] potential for 
prejudice"; and the State failed to show McKenzie "qualified as an expert." R. 60-61. 
Further, the trial court held McKenzie's testimony: "(1) [is] relevant and 
admissible; (2) is specialized knowledge that would be helpful to the jury in determining 
an issue of fact; (3) is reasonably relied upon by experts in the psychological professions; 
and (4) finally, that the probative value is not substantially outweighed by any danger of 
prejudice." R. 149, 150-53. "Moreover, [Valdez5s] contention that testimony concerning 
BWS is merely anecdotal in nature and should be excluded under Utah precedent as set 
forth in [Rammel and Iorg] is in error as those cases are clearly distinguishable." IdL. at 
149, 153-56. Instead, the tests "set forth in State v. Kellev. 2000 UT 41, 1 P.3d 546, and 
State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, 5 P.3d 642," apply. Id,; see Aplt. Br. at 37 n. 13. 
Thus, Valdez preserved his arguments on appeal by raising them before the trial 
court. See Hart, 945 P.2d at 129 (holding issue preserved if "'"submitted to the trial 
court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue"5"). Besides, even if 
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Valdez had not raised each sub-argument below, he properly preserved the issue for 
appeal by objecting to McKenzie's testimony. See State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 
332,f25 n. 4, 37 P.3d 260 (addressing identity issue even though not specifically 
preserved because defendant preserved probable cause issue and "State bears the burden 
of proving" articulable suspicion (including identity) within probable cause issue). 
B. Valdez Was Not Required To Marshal the Evidence In Support of the Trial 
Court's Admission of McKenzie's Testimony. 
The State claims Valdez "purports" but fails to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's admission of McKenzie's testimony. Aple. Br. at 36 (citations omitted). 
However, Valdez does not purport to marshal. Aplt. Br. at 33-44. Moreover, he is not 
required to marshal because he is challenging a question of law, whether BWS testimony 
is admissible when no foundation showing the alleged victim suffers from BWS is 
established. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating a party need only marshal evidence 
when "challenging a fact finding"); Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George . 898 
P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995) ("The issue of whether evidence is admissible is a question 
of law, which we review for correctness, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of 
review for subsidiary factual determinations." (quotations and citation omitted)).8 
8
 None of the cases cited by the State suggest a defendant must marshal the 
evidence when challenging the admissibility of evidence. See. Aple. Br. at 35-36; State 
v. Colwell. 2000 UT 8,^20, 994 P.2d 177 (holding defendant must marshal evidence in 
step three of Batson test to show trial court clearly erred by finding State's peremptory 
challenges were gender neutral); State v. Gallegos. 851 P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding defendant must marshal when challenging sufficiency of evidence); 
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Besides, there is no evidence to marshal. To properly marshal, "the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Moon, 1999 
UT App 12 at [^24. In this case, the trial court ruled McKenzie's testimony was 
admissible because Jiminez, the alleged victim, recanted.9 R. 150-63. It would have 
reached the same conclusion in any case where the alleged victim of domestic violence 
recanted her testimony. Id Thus, because the trial court's ruling was a matter of law and 
was not affected by any evidence in the case, there is no evidence to marshal.10 Id 
£ . The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting McKenzie's Testimony. 
First, the State claims "courts have universally admitted BWS evidence to explain 
a victim's recantation in a domestic violence case." Aple. Br. at 36 (citations omitted). 
However, this claim ignores the widely-held rule that BWS testimony is not admissible 
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 780-81 (discussing admissibility of evidence without mentioning 
any marshaling requirement). 
9
 Specifically, the trial court ruled McKenzie's testimony was admissible because 
it would explain "the contradicting behavioral patterns of the victim," "assist the jury in 
understanding why victims of domestic violence might. . . recant statements," and "help 
the jury in understanding the general characteristics of BWS." R. 150-63. 
10
 The State asserts in its brief that Valdez's presentence report and the preliminary 
hearing transcript suggest Valdez and Jiminez's relationship may have been abusive. 
Aple. Br. at 38 (citing R. 206A; R. 207:4). However, none of this information was 
presented at trial so it is not evidence to be marshaled. See. Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at 
^24 (holding to properly marshal, "challenger must present.. . every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists" 
(emphasis added)). 
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until its relevance is established by showing "a pattern of abuse/battering" by the 
defendant against the victim. Adame v. State. 534 S.E.2d 817, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); 
see Aplt. Br. at 34 n. 12.11 It also ignores Utah's adherence to the relevance requirement 
in similar evidentiary situations. See Utah R. Evid. 402 ("All relevant evidence is 
admissible."); State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 403 (Utah 1989) (holding expert 
testimony inadmissible because State did not lay adequate foundation to establish 
reliability to the effect that the child matched the profile of an abused child). 
Further, it ignores Utah's abhorrence of "anecdotal 'statistical' evidence 
concerning matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis such as witness veracity." 
Iorg, 801 P.2d at 941; see RammeL 721 P.2d at 499-500 (same); Aplt. Br. at 36-39. 
Finally, it ignores Utah's refusal to admit expert testimony where, as here, there is no 
1 ]
 To support its claim, the State cites several cases. See Aple. Br. at 36-37. 
However, most of these cases require a showing of relevancy. See_ State v. Grecinger. 
569 N.W.2d 189, 195, 197 (Minn. 1997) (holding BWS testimony admissible to bolster 
victim's credibility only if defense attacks victim's credibility); People v. Johnson, 74 
P.3d 349, 353 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (holding BWS testimony admissible because People 
established proper foundation by presenting evidence that "defendant acknowledged 
having been in prior violent altercations with the victim"); People v. Williams. 93 Ca. 
Rptr. 2d 356, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding BWS testimony admissible without 
evidence showing history of violence because expert testified that "recanting does not 
happen only after there has been a continuing pattern of abuse. In fact, depending on the 
severity of the incident, it is more likely to occur after a first incident"). The remaining 
cases do not address relevancy. See Arcoren v. United States. 929 F.2d 1235, 1241 (8 th 
Cir. 1991) (noting defendant only challenged BWS expert under rule 702 and did not 
"challenge either the reliability or the general admissibility of [BWS] evidence"); State v. 
Weaver. 648 N.W.2d 355, 363-65 (S.D. 2002) (holding BWS evidence admissible 
without addressing whether evidence establishing history of violence was admitted). 
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foundation to assist the jury in sorting "the abused from the nonabused with any degree 
of accuracy." Rimmasck 775 P.2d at 395; see Utah R. Evid. 702 (saying expert may 
testify only if testimony "will assist the trier of fact"); People v. Simpkins. 697 N.E.2d 
302, 311-12 (111. App. Ct. 1998) (holding expert testimony that children recant because 
of unsupportive families or because they feel like scapegoats inadmissible because "no 
evidence was presented that [victim] recanted her allegations against defendant because 
of an unsupportive family or because she felt like a scapegoat"); Aplt. Br. at 39-40. 
Second, the State argues the "the pattern of violence between defendant and 
[Jiminez]. . . was well-established." Aple. Br. at 37-38. However, in making this 
argument, the State cites alleged acts and testimony that were not admitted at trial. Id. 
Only information known by the jurors could have established the relevancy of 
McKenzie's testimony and assisted the jurors in deciding whether Jiminez recanted 
because she suffered from BWS. See. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403 (holding expert 
testimony inadmissible because State did not lay adequate foundation to establish 
reliability to the effect that the child matched the profile of an abused child); Aplt. Br. at 
34 n. 12. Thus, because the jury was not given any information about Valdez's and 
Jiminez's history, it had no foundation from which to decide whether McKenzie's 
testimony was applicable. See Aplt. Br. at 34-40. 
Third, the State claims McKenzie's testimony did not inadmissibly comment on 
Jiminez's credibility because defense counsel argued Jiminez's testimony was "a 'wash'" 
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during closing argument. Aple. Br. at 39. However, this argument ignores a defendant's 
right to defend himself. See. U.S. Const. Amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance 
of counsel for his defense."); Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12 ("In criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel."). It also 
ignores defense counsel's duty to vigorously defend his client. Utah R. Prof. Conduct 
1.3 comment ("A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition . 
. . and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's 
cause or endeavor."). If a trial court abuses its discretion by admitting inadmissible 
evidence, the defendant is permitted to continue defending himself and defense counsel 
is obligated to zealously assist. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 781 (holding trial court's error 
will be reversed on appeal "if, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that there 
would have been a more favorable result of the defendant"). Here, defense counsel 
commented on Jiminez's credibility during closing argument, after arguing McKenzie's 
testimony should have been excluded and preserving the issue for appeal. See R. 
211:125-26. In other words, defense counsel continued to vigorously defend Valdez 
after the trial court's erroneous ruling by attempting to minimize the importance of 
Jiminez's testimony, thereby counteracting the prejudicial effect of McKenzie's BWS 
testimony. Id. Accordingly, this Court should reverse because McKenzie's testimony 
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inadmissibly commented on Jiminez's credibility. See Aplt. Br. at 40-42. 
D. The Trial Court's Admission of McKenzie's Testimony Was Harmful Error. 
The State alleges Valdez was not prejudiced by the admission of McKenzie's 
testimony because Valdez "was acquitted of both domestic violence charges." Aple. Br. 
at 36. However, all of Valdez's charges were domestic violence related and, accordingly, 
relied heavily on Jiminez's credibility. R. 2-4; 35-38. Valdez was charged with five 
crimes under the heading, "Domestic Violence Information." Id. These charges alleged 
Valdez entered an apartment with the intent to assault his girlfriend, assaulted his 
girlfriend, used a gun to commit this assault, committed the assault in the presence of his 
girlfriend's son, and slashed the tires of his girlfriend's car immediately after the assault. 
Id; R. 207:5-8; 210:55-59, 71-75. To convict Valdez of any of these crimes, the jury 
had to reject Jiminez's trial testimony because she was the alleged victim, she said the 
crimes did not occur, and she explained her prior inconsistent statements and the 
inconsistent statements of the other witnesses. R. 210:55-59, 71-75. Thus, the admission 
of McKenzie's detailed expert testimony on BWS directly affected the outcome of 
Valdez's trial because it baselessly destroyed the credibility of Jiminez's trial testimony 
and painted Valdez as a batterer deserving of punishment. See Aplt. Br. at 42-44. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse because the State's peremptory strikes violated equal 
protection and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting BWS expert testimony. 
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